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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic implications of the existence of the
right to silence in criminal trial in the context of Roman law doctrine.
The right confers to the defendant the privilege that, in the context of a
signalling game, i. e. the trial, no adverse conclusions may be drawn from
his exercise of the right. It is shown that respect for the right to silence
does not have signiﬁcant strategic consequences. In particular, no inﬂuence
on conviction rates exists, neither rightful nor wrongful ones.
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Introduction
Recently there has been a surging interest in the economics literature in what
in American legal culture is called the Miranda Right  the `right to silence'
of a suspect during criminal investigation as well as during court proceedings.
Seidmann (2005), for example, has analyzed the strategic implications of this
right for the cases of English and American juri rules. The crucial diﬀerence
between the two is that, in the `English game' inferences from the silence of a
defendant can be drawn, whereas for the `American game' the juri is not allowed in
this case to draw adverse inferences. Seidmann's main ﬁnding is that, respecting
the right to silence can protect innocent suspects with high a-priori probability
of being guilty and, at the same time, does not aﬀect the confession rate.1
It is interesting to look at this issue in the context of a `Roman game' where,
in contrast to `American' and `English games', confession does not automatically
end proceedings, triggering immediate conviction, eventually as a consequence of
some plea bargain. Rather it is possible that the defendant confesses, having in
mind a lesser sentence, but his lawyer, who in Roman law doctrine is somehow
an independent actor in administration of justice, insists that all evidence be
presented and pondered by the juri. The right to silence then is an alternative
option to making a statement about what really is of interest  guilt or innocence.
From the strategic point of view, respect for the right forces the juri, or a judge,
to not use the fact of silence as a pretext for presumption of guilt, but to rely
on either prior evidence, that is (and should be) known to all parties at the time
trial begins, or evidence that may manifest itself during proceedings. There is,
however, considerable uncertainty as to whether this right is always respected.
Therefore, the defendant when deciding whether to remain silent faces consider-
able uncertainty, being forced to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of a reduced sentence for
confession, should he be convicted, against the advantage that the right to silence
may oﬀer  to guilty as well as innocent defendants.
We will look at this issue from the perspective of signalling theory (Spence(1973),
Milgrom and Roberts (1986)) in a stylized model of court proceedings: a defen-
dant may be guilty or innocent of a crime he has been accused of. At the start
of the trial, some evidence is known to all parties and all hold a common prior
as to the probability that this evidence shows that the defendant is guilty. The
defendant is asked for his plea, guilty or innocent, but he may also exercise his
right to silence. Pleading guilty gives the right to a lesser sentence if convicted.
During trial new information enters the scene,2 that, as such, either reveals the
1There has been an ongoing debate in the U.S. over the last fourty years about the implica-
tions of the introduction of the Miranda right in 1966 that centers more on the eﬀectiveness of
criminal investigation and crime clearance rates. For early evidence, see Seeburger and Wettick
(1967). Contemporary reviews and assessments of the empirical literature can be found in
Cassell (1996, 1998), Schulhofer (1996) and Leo (2001).
2This could be a new witness, or a known witness that reveals new information. It could
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defendant's type or is inconclusive. Both possibilities occur with certain com-
monly known probabilities. In case of inconclusiveness, the juri may use the
prior probability for ﬁnding the verdict  but it may also draw conclusions from
the defendants initial statement. We will then examine two cases: either the juri
is allowed to use its (rational) beliefs, or it restricts itself, with certain probabil-
ity, not to use, at information sets where the defendant is silent, any inference
to his disadvantage. In the latter case the verdict is reached by using only the
commonly known prior evidence.
The most closely related literature is Seidmann (2005), where the defendant
can be any of several innocent types and one guilty type. The guilty type sees his
probability of being guilty always increased after a key witness is heard since he is
always confused by the latter with exactly one of the innocent types. An innocent
type is identiﬁed with certain probability, whereas with inverse probability he just
is confused with the guilty one. Therefore, the witness just never does not know
anything. Further crucial diﬀerences are that, in Seidmann's setting a guilty plea
basically ends the game, and he looks at equilibria where innocent defendants
always tell the truth, namely that they are innocent.
Framework
We imagine an idealized framework of a court proceeding, with the defendant
ﬁrst being asked to make his plea. Then a witness is heard, and ﬁnally, the juri
gives its verdict.
The defendant may be guilty, G, or innocent, I, being the a-priori probability
of the G-type pG ∈ (0, 1) and that of the I-type pI = 1− pG. He may send one of
three possible signals from the set {G,Q, I}, with the possibility to use a mixed
strategy. G and I, of course, mean statement of guilt and innocence, respectively,
whereas Q denotes the defendant exercizing his right to remain silent. After the
signal is sent, the witness is heard, even if the defendant declares himself guilty.
We assume that the witness knows of guiltyness or innocence of the defendant
with probability r, whereas with probability 1 − r he does not know. In either
case, the witness truthfully reveals the respective fact to the juri. The juri, after
having observed the signal and the witness' statement, decides about acquittal,
A, or conviction, C, of the defendant. If the witness claims to be informed,
then the juri decides correspondingly without further inference, disregarding any
statement made by the defendant. For the case of an uninformed witness, the
juri will engage in Bayesian inference and form its beliefs.
Concerning the juri's verdict, after the witness has revealed its ignorance, we
will analyze two diﬀerent sets of rules:
also be some new scientiﬁc method, say a state-of-the-art forensic test, for example.
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(A) In order to decide about conviction or acquittal, the juri can use arbitrary
beliefs at any information set.
(B) In order to make the same decision, the juri honors with probability s the
right of the defendant to be silent (signal Q), in the following sense:
(i) If the signal Q is oﬀ the equilibrium path, then a-priori probability pG
must be used for decision making.
(ii) If the signal Q is on the equilibrium path, then the lower one of the
two probabilities, p(G|Q) or pG, must be used for decision making.3
With probability 1− s the juri just has the same option as in (A).
In both settings, the rational jury will do correct Bayesian updating, of course,
and it uses these updates in setting (A), together with unrestricted beliefs at
information sets oﬀ the equilibrium path, for coming to a verdict. In setting
(B), however, although rational as well, the jury will not always use the updates,
or arbitrary beliefs oﬀ equilibrium, for decision making: at information set Q
decision is limited by rules (i) and (ii). So the juri compromises, with certain
probability, not to use its rational inference or arbitrary conjectures against the
G(-uilty) type of defendant if this one chooses to be silent.
Payoﬀs for the two suspect types are as follows: both types earn a direct
payoﬀ from acquittal of 0, a < 0 if convicted after having confessed, and b, with
b < a, if convicted without confession. The relatively more moderate punishment
a is traditionally meant to incentivate a defendant to come forward with the truth
(probably also in order to save the juri's time). For the I-type of defendant we
make the assumption that he earns an additional pecuniary payoﬀ from either
saying the truth, I, being quiet, Q, or wrongly admitting guilt, G, of 0, δQ and
δG, respectively, with δG < δQ < 0. This models the idea that `good guys' feel
like telling the truth and only the truth, whereas the `bad guys' do not care.
Payoﬀ for the juri basically depends on making the correct decision. It derives
the highest payoﬀ, c > 0, if it convicts the G-type of defendant. Payoﬀ for
acquitting the I-type, d > 0, is not greater than c. Acquitting the G-type gives
a payoﬀ of e < 0. The worst situation is to convict the innocent I-type, giving a
payoﬀ f strictly lower than that before. So we assume
f < e < 0 < d ≤ c. (1)
3Note another diﬀerence to Seidmann's (2005) treatment of the consequences of the right
to silence. He assumes that at any information set where the defendant is silent, the updated
prior probability after testimony of the witness must be used to ﬁnd the verdict. This excludes,
however, the possibility to draw a favourable Bayesian inference from silence: if it were known
that, in equilibrium, only innocent types show up at an information set with defendant's silence,
then the juri should rationally acquit instead of looking at non-strategic probabilities. This does
not hurt a defendant's right to silence.
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We denote by pjA and p
j
C the probabilities of acquittal or conviction, respec-
tively, after the jury hears one of the three possible statements by the defendant,
j = G,Q, I and in case of an inconclusive testimony. Obviously, pjA+p
j
C = 1. We
denote by ρ = {(pjA, pjC)}j=G,Q,I the mixed strategy of the juri. As to the defen-
dant, we denote by qij the probability of sending signal j when type is i = G, I.
Obviously, we have qiG + q
i
Q + q
i
I = 1.
In the following we will derive all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991a, 1991b)) for this signalling model (Spence (1973)) and look at the
diﬀerences that might emerge for the two regimes of juri behaviour.
Preliminary Results
The following behaviour makes part of any equilibrium:
1. If the type of the defendent is revealed by the witness, then type G is
convicted, type I acquitted.
2. If the juri is not informed, then it is indiﬀerent between acquittal and
conviction iﬀ
p˜∗G · c+ (1− p˜∗G) · f != p˜∗G · e+ (1− p˜∗G) · d
⇔ p˜∗G =
d− f
(c− e) + (d− f) < 1, (2)
where p˜G is the juri's belief that it faces the G(uilty)-type of defendant at
a certain information set.
Payoﬀ for defendent-type i = G, I, given his statement j = G,Q, I and given
the juri's mixed strategy ρ, then is u(j, ρ|i), where
u(G, ρ|G) = [r + (1− r)pGC ] · a (3)
u(Q, ρ|G) = [r + (1− r)pQC ] · b (4)
u(I, ρ|G) = [r + (1− r)pIC ] · b (5)
for type G, and
u(G, ρ|I) = (1− r)pGC · a+ δG (6)
u(Q, ρ|I) = (1− r)pGC · b+ δQ (7)
u(I, ρ|I) = (1− r)pIC · b (8)
for type I.
In order to decide under which conditions the two types of defendants may
use mixed strategies, one has to ﬁgure out in which cases they feel indiﬀerent
between the various types of messages they can send.
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G-Type
G ∼ Q ⇔ pQC =
r(a− b) + (1− r)pGC · a
(1− r)b . (9)
In order to guarantee that the fraction is between 0 and 1, we must have
pCG ≥ −
r
1− r ·
a− b
a
. (10)
G ∼ I ⇔ pIC =
r(a− b) + (1− r)pGC · a
(1− r)b , (11)
where we also require (10) for the same reason as before.
Q ∼ I ⇔ pQC = pIC . (12)
I-Type
G ∼ Q ⇔ pQC =
(1− r)pGC · a+ δG − δQ
(1− r)b . (13)
The necessary condition for having the fraction between 0 and 1 is
pCG ≤
(1− r) · b+ δQ − δG
(1− r) · a , (14)
which in turn requires that parameters must be such that
(1− r) · b ≤ δG − δQ. (15)
G ∼ I ⇔ pIC =
(1− r)pGC · a+ δG
(1− r)b . (16)
Here we need to have
pCG ≤
(1− r) · b− δG
(1− r) · a , (17)
which in turn requires
(1− r) · b− δG ≤ 0. (18)
Q ∼ I ⇔ pQC = pIC −
δQ
(1− r)b. (19)
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For this to be possible it is necessary to guarantee that
pCI ≥
δQ
(1− r) · b. (20)
It is illustrative to contrast the preference relations of the two types concerning
the three pure strategies. Table 1 reads as `indiﬀerence in the respective ﬁrst
column implies the preference relationship in the respective second one'. So the
ﬁrst row, for example, says that if type G is indiﬀerent between G and Q, then
type I prefers Q over G, and if the latter type is indiﬀerent between the same
two alternatives, then type G prefers G over Q.
Type
G I I G
G ∼ Q Q  G G ∼ Q G  Q
G ∼ I I  G G ∼ I G  I
Q ∼ I I  Q Q ∼ I Q  I
Table 1: Implications of indiﬀerence of a player for the respective other.
It is then quite obvious that both types won't mix the same two strategies in
any equilibrium.
Results
A complete treatment of all possibilities for the two regimes is given in the Ap-
pendix. Here we will have a look at the most interesting cases.
First of all, for a > rb the worst to happen to type G when sending signal
G is strictly better than the best that can happen to him with any of the other
choices. So G would always stick with G, and type I, by the intuitive criterion
(Cho and Kreps (1987)) should therefore always send signal I. The `rebate' from
making a confession is suﬃciently high to warrant the G(-uilty) type to accept it.
For a = rb signal G weakly dominates anything else from type G's perspective,
whereby payoﬀ a is matched only in case that he always is acquitted with any of
the other options. Also in this case it appears reasonable to assume that he would
stick to option G  only to be sure  and then type I would again be best-oﬀ
with signal I. The interesting case is therefore a < rb, which will be assumed in
what follows.
A-priori Strong Evidence: pG > p˜
∗
G
If pG > p˜
∗
G then there is strong enough evidence for conviction prior to hearing the
witness, and when the answer of the witness is not informative, then, unless the
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signalling framework is revealing, a-priori information is used by the juri when
coming to a decision.
It is quite clear that, for this case, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are the same
for both sets of rules guiding the juri: if an outcome can be sustained as an
equilibrium with rule (A), then, if information set Q is oﬀ-equilibrium, p(G|Q) >
p˜∗G sustains this equilibrium, and so does pG > p˜
∗
G for rule (B). If Q is on the
equilibrium path, then, if p(G|Q) ≥ p˜∗G, also min{p(G|Q), pG} ≥ p˜∗G, and in
case of p(G|Q) < p˜∗G we have min{p(G|Q), pG} = p(G|Q), implying the same
consequence in (B) as in (A). On the other hand, looking at an equilibrium
for rule (B), it is clear that it also goes through in (A) because, Q being oﬀ
equilibrium, choosing p(G|Q) > p˜∗G has the same implication as pG > p˜∗G, and
with Q on the equilibrium path, choosing in setting (A) the same beliefs as in (B)
has the same consequences and creates the same incentives for the defendant.
The following Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in mixed strategies can then be
identiﬁed (see Appendix):
(i) Pooling (G,G), with juri convicting. Necessary condition: δG ≥ (1− r)(b−
a). See Lemma 1.
(ii) Semi-Pooling ((G,Q), Q), withG-type defendant mixing with qGQ =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
,
and juri mixing with (pGC , p
Q
C , p
I
C) = (1,
a/b−r
1−r , 1). Necessary condition:
δQ ≥ b− a. See Lemma 8.4
(iii) Semi-Pooling ((G, I), I), with G-type defendant mixing with qGI =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
,
and juri mixing with (pGC , p
Q
C , p
I
C) = (1, 1,
a/b−r
1−r ). See Lemma 9.
Note that equilibrium type (iii) does always exist, whereas the other two
disappear if the cost for the innocent type, I, of lying, δG, and of being silent,
Q, δQ, respectively, are too high. In the latter case, type I always sticks with
the truth, but he cannot distinguish himself completely from the G(-uilty) guy
(because a < rb) who chooses, with strictly positive probability, but not always,
to mimic the innocent one. Therefore, the guilty are not always convicted and
the innocent not always acquitted.
Now suppose that costs of being silent for the I-type become lower, such that
δQ ≥ b−a, so that equilibrium type (ii) appears. Clearly (ii) and (iii) are similar,
with the unique diﬀerence being the costs of being silent imposed on the innocent
type. From the point of view of equilibrium selection we would therefore expect
that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (iii) be selected.
Finally, if δG ≥ (1− r)(b− a), then equilibrium type (i) becomes available 
type I feels the cost of not telling the truth as lower as the beneﬁt of a reduced
4Note that it is this type of equilibrium that is excluded in Seidmann (2005) because in his
interpretation of the Miranda Right, pG > p˜
∗
G must be used at Q to decide over acquittal or
conviction (which implies conviction in this case).
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sentence if convicted. Clearly, this equilibrium is the worst for both types since
both are always convicted, so equilibrium type (i) is strictly dominated for each
type of defendant by either (ii) or (iii). Nevertheless, with equilibrium types (ii)
and (iii) there is, of course, a risk of getting a heavier-handed sentence in the
worst case. So equilibrium type (i) is the risk-dominant one.
Nevertheless, for strong a-priori evidence, there is no diﬀerence for the two
juri rules considered.
A-priori Weak Evidence: pG < p˜
∗
G
In this case equilibria for both sets of rules may be diﬀerent because, even with
beliefs indicating the G-type at information set Q, the defendant is not always
convicted. The following equilibria can be identiﬁed (see Appendix):
(i) Pooling (G,G) with juri acquitting. Necessary condition: (A) δG ≥ (1−r)b,
(B) δG ≥ (1− r)b and s ≤ 1− δG−δQ(1−r)b . See Lemma 1.
(ii) Pooling (Q,Q) with juri acquitting. Necessary condition: δQ ≥ (1− r)b for
both, (A) and (B). See Lemma 4.
(iii) Separating (Q, I) with juri acquitting at both, Q and I. Necessary condi-
tion: s = 1 and only for rule set (B). See Lemma 5.
(iv) Pooling (I, I) with juri acquitting. Same for (A) and (B). See Lemma 6.
Let us again start our analysis with the case of excessively high costs for not
telling the truth and for being silent, δG, δQ < (1 − r)b and δQ < b − a. In this
case, only equilibria of types (iii) and (iv) can exist. Type (iii) is possible only
if the right to silence is perfectly respected. In fact, in this case, the bad guy
ousts himself as such by the signal sent, but he cannot be convicted because of
his silence. It seems that having the right to silence makes it possible to separate
the types without being able to convict the bad guys.
Now let us suppose that the costs for the innocent type of being silent and
of lying are suﬃciently low to allow him also to consider Q and G as an answer.
Then also equilibria (i) and (ii) become available. Equilibrium type (ii) is Pareto-
dominated by (iv) because the latter does not impose the cost of lying on the
innocent type. Moreover (iv) is not riskier than (ii). So we may eliminate (ii).
For rule set (A), and for (B) with the right to silence not too much respected,
equilibrium (i) is better for type G because he gets a lesser sentence when iden-
tiﬁed by the witness, but type I bears the cost of making a wrongful confession.
Nevertheless, if the right to silence is perfectly respected one ends up with either
equilibrium (iii) or (iv), and then, in terms of implications, there is no diﬀerence
between both sets of rules, (A) and (B).
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Therefore, also if a-priori evidence is weak, it appears that a well-respected
right to silence does not have much of an inﬂuence on strategic decisions of
defendants, allowing only the guilty type to reveal his type without getting him
convicted, though.
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated the strategic implications of the `right to silence' for
criminal trial in a `Roman' setting where confession, unlike in English and Amer-
ican law, does not automatically trigger conviction. It has been shown that the
existence of the right does not alter the expected outcome of a stylized but real-
istic `trial game' in terms of conviction or acquittal of the two types. Therefore,
the option is a somehow redundant alternative to claiming innocence, as long as
only rational conclusions are drawn from silence (and lying is not punished as
such)  so either silence or claiming innocence seem quite similar to cheap talk
(Crawford and Sobel (1982)). But why is this the case? The reason is that, if
prior evidence is weak, then the guilty type can always decide to pool with the
innocent one, achieving his goal to be acquitted. Therefore, in order to avoid
deviation to silence, if this is oﬀ-equilibrium, one does not need strong beliefs
that there the bad guy shows up  in fact, it is even weakly suﬃcient to believe
that the good guy arrives. For the case of strong evidence of facing the bad guy,
either this evidence or a belief of facing him with certainty is suﬃcient to avoid
deviation to silence if this behaviour is out-of-equilibrium. If silence is on the
equilibrium path, then this is only possible if the guilty type is not always con-
victed, beause otherwise he would choose to confess guilt. This means that the
juri is just indiﬀerent between acquittal and conviction. Therefore, the Bayesian
belief of guilt is lower than a-priori probability, so, by part (ii) of our rule guiding
a juri that respects the right to silence, the Bayesian update is used  as in the
case of no respect for the right at all. Note that just this latter point is the
crucial diﬀerence to Seidmann (2005): for him the Miranda right means that no
inference at all from silence may be drawn  not even if it is of advantage to the
innocent.
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Appendix
In this appendix we turn to the identiﬁcation of all equilibria in pure and mixed
strategies. From the methodological point of view we iterate through all possible
strategies of defendant-type G, then for the those of type I, and ﬁnally those of
the juri, ﬁtting them together as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it is possible.
1) G uses G
I chooses G (Pooling Equilibrium (G,G)): In this pooling equilibrium
there are three possibilities, depending on whether the juri convicts, acquits or
uses a mixed strategy. This in turn depends on whether the probability of facing
the G-type is suﬃciently high or not.
i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): (A) Payoﬀ for type G is a, for type I its (1 −
r)a + δG. Type G does not deviate because in both alternatives he would
obtain b only. Type I would receive (1− r)b in I, so he does not deviate iﬀ
δG ≥ (1 − r)(b − a). As to option Q, he would have payoﬀ (1 − r)b + δQ,
making it unworthy to deviate iﬀ δG − δQ ≥ (1− r)(b− a). Note that this
latter condition is implied by the earlier one. (B) For a-priori probabilities
the juri convicts, so restricted behaviour leads to the same result.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): (A) Payoﬀ for type G is ra, for type I its δG. Type
G does not deviate because in both alternatives he would obtain b only.
Type I would receive (1− r)b in I, so he does not deviate iﬀ δG ≥ (1− r)b.
As to option Q, he would have payoﬀ (1 − r)b + δQ, making it unworthy
to deviate iﬀ δG − δQ ≥ (1 − r)b. Note that also here this latter condition
is implied by the earlier one. (B) Type G does not deviate to Q because
b[r + (1− r)(1− s)] ≤ ra, and I isn't attractive either for the same reason
as in (A). Type I does not deviate to Q iﬀ (1− r)(1− s)b + δQ ≤ δG, i.e.
s ≤ 1− δG−δQ
(1−r)b . This requires δG − δQ ≥ (1− r)b. He does not deviate to I
iﬀ δG ≥ (1− r)b. Again, this latter condition implies the previous one.
iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): (A) Payoﬀ for G is [r+(1−r)pGC ]a, for I its
(1−r)pGCa+δG. Type G never deviates because in doing so he would receive
payoﬀ b only. Type I does not deviate to Q iﬀ δG−δQ ≥ (1−r)(b−pGCa), and
I is not attractive iﬀ δG ≥ (1−r)(b−pGCa). Note that the earlier condition is
implied by the latter, which can be written as pGC ≤ (1−r)b−δG(1−r)a . For this to be
possible we require δG ≥ (1−r)b. Hence, given that this condition is fulﬁlled
with strict inequality, the juri can use any mixing with pGC ∈ (0, (1−r)b−δG(1−r)a ].
(B) Type G does not deviate to Q iﬀ b[r+(1−r)(1−s)] ≤ [r+(1−r)pGC ]a,
i.e. pGC ≤ b/a[r+(1−r)(1−s)]−r1−r (a). He would not go for I because he can only
earn b. Type I does not deviate to Q iﬀ (1− r)(1− s)b ≤ (1− r)pGCa+ δG,
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or equivalently, pGC ≤ (1−r)(1−s)b−δG(1−r)a (b). For this to be possible, we need
δG ≥ (1− r)(1− s)b. He won't deviate to I iﬀ (1− r)b ≤ (1− r)pGCa+ δG,
i.e. pGC ≤ (1−r)b−δG(1−r)a (c). This requires δG ≥ (1 − r)b and is implied by the
ﬁrst inequality involving δG. Note that (b) implies (c).
These results can be gathered in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A pooling equilibrium on (G,G) does exist.
(A) For pG ≥ p˜∗G the necessary condition for existence is δG ≥ (1−r)(b−a), and
in this case the juri convicts when observing G. For pG ≤ p˜∗G the necessary
condition for existence is δG ≥ (1 − r)b, and in this case the juri acquits
when observing G. For pG = p˜
∗
G and δG > (1−r)b the juri may use a mixed
strategy with pGC ∈ (0, (1−r)b−δG(1−r)a ].
(B) For pG ≥ p˜∗G the same equilibrium exists as in (A). For pG ≤ p˜∗G the neces-
sary condition for existence is δG ≥ (1− r)b and s ≤ 1− δG−δQ(1−r)b , and in this
case the juri acquits when observing G. For pG = p˜
∗
G and δG > (1−r)(1−s)b
the juri may use a mixed strategy with
pGC ∈
(
0,min
{
(1− r)(1− s)b− δG
(1− r)a ,
b/a[r + (1− r)(1− s)]− r
1− r
}]
. (21)
In all cases, besides of the restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at the respective information
set.
I chooses Q (Separating Equilibrium (G,Q)): Payoﬀ of type G is a,
whereas type I earns δQ. (A) Type G does not deviate to Q iﬀ rb ≤ a, whereas
he never deviates to I because with that he earns b. Type I won't deviate to G
because there he would only receive (1 − r)a + δG, and he wouldn't choose I iﬀ
(1− r)b ≤ δQ. (B) Interpreting the statement Q as coming from the I-type only
is of advantage to him, so using the result from Bayesian updating does not hurt
him. The separating equilibrium is the same for (A) and (B).
Lemma 2 A separating equilibrium (G,Q) exists iﬀ rb ≤ a and δQ ≥ (1 − r)b.
It is the same for rules (A) and (B). Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such
that the juri convicts the defendant at information set I.
I chooses I (Separating Equilibrium (G,I)): Payoﬀ for G is a, for I it is
0. (A) Type G does not deviate to Q because with that he earns b. He does not
choose to deviate to I iﬀ rb ≤ a. Type I does not deviate to neither G nor Q,
because his payoﬀs would be (1 − r)a + δG and (1 − r)b + δQ, respectively. (B)
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For pG ≥ p˜∗G the juri convicts if using prior information. Therefore, the outcome
is the same as in (A). If pG < p˜
∗
G then the juri will acquit with probability s at
the (supposed) out-of-equilibrium information set Q, leaving type G with payoﬀ
b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)] and type I with payoﬀ (1 − r)(1 − s)b + δQ. So I does not
deviate, and G does not deviate iﬀ s ≤ 1 − a/b−r
1−r . The following lemma states
this result.
Lemma 3 A separating equilibrium (G, I) does exist iﬀ rb ≤ a. In context (B),
and for pG < p˜
∗
G, we require additionally s ≤ 1− a/b−r1−r .
In all cases, besides of the restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at the respective information
set.
I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: In face of type G's ﬁxed strategy G,
it is not possible for type I to mix strategy I with anything else because at I
beliefs of the juri must be I-type, and then I's payoﬀ is strictly higher than
with anything else. Also, type I mixing G and Q is not possible because in Q
beliefs must be I-type, and then he earns in Q always strictly more than in G,
independently of setting (A) or (B). Hence, no equilibrium exists where type G
chooses pure strategy G and type I strictly mixes.
2) G uses Q
I uses G (Separating Equilibrium (Q,G)): In both settings, (A) and (B),
this clearly cannot be an equilibrium because type G would deviate to G.
I uses Q (Pooling Equilibrium (Q,Q)): It is irrelevant whether we are in
setting (A) or (B) because p(G|Q) = pG. Three cases must be distinguished.
i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): Payoﬀ for G is b, for I it is (1− r)b+ δQ. But then
type G is better-oﬀ with G.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): Payoﬀ for G is rb, for I it is δQ. Type G does not
deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ rb. He won't deviate to I at all because with that he
receives b. Type I does not deviate to G because (1 − r)a + δG < δQ. He
will not choose I iﬀ (1− r)b ≤ δQ.
iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): Type G's payoﬀ is [r + (1 − r)pQC ]b, that
of type I is (1 − r)pQCb + δQ. G does not deviate to G as long as a ≤
b[r+ (1− r)pQC ] or pQC ≤ a/b−r1−r . This requires a ≤ br. G does not deviate to
I either because he would earn b only. As to type I, he does not deviate to
G iﬀ (1 − r)a + δG ≤ (1 − r)pQCb + δQ i.e. pQC ≤ (1−r)a+δG−δQ(1−r)b . Not having
him deviate to I requires (1 − r)b ≤ (1 − r)pQCb + δQ, i.e. pQC ≤ (1−r)b−δQ(1−r)b .
This latter condition implies the former one.
12
We can state these results in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 A class of pooling equilibria (Q,Q) does exist iﬀ a ≤ rb, pG ≤ p˜∗G and
δQ ≥ (1 − r)b are fulﬁlled simultaneously. In the pure-strategy equilibrium the
defendant is acquitted in equilibrium. For pG = p˜
∗
G, and with δQ > (1 − r)b and
a < br, the juri may use a mixed strategy, with pQC ∈ (0,min{ (1−r)b−δQ(1−r)b , a/b−r1−r }.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at
information sets G and I. Equilibria are identical for settings (A) and (B).
I uses I (Separating Equilibrium (Q,I)): (A) This cannot be an equilib-
rium because type G would deviate to I. (B) This cannot be an equilibrium
either, unless for pG ≤ p˜∗G and s = 1.
Lemma 5 A separating equilibrium (Q, I) does exist only in setting (B) and for
pG ≤ p˜∗G and s = 1.
I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: With the same argument as before,
strategy I cannot make part of such an equilibrium. So it remains to look at
mixing between G and Q. Then, however, type G would deviate to G to earn a
higher payoﬀ. Note that this argument is independent of setting (A) or (B). So
there is no equilibrium with type G choosing Q and type I doing any mixing.
3) G uses I
I uses G (Separating Equilibrium (I,G)): This cannot be an equilibrium
in none of the settings, (A) or (B), because type G would deviate to G.
I uses Q (Separating Equilibrium (I,Q)): This cannot be an equilibrium,
in neither setting, because type G, again, would deviate to G.
I uses I (Pooling Equilibrium (I,I)): Again we have to distinguish three
cases.
i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): Type G would obviously deviate to G, in both
settings.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): (A) Payoﬀ for G is rb, for I it is 0. Type G does
not deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ rb. He won't deviate to Q at all because with that
he receives b. Type I does not deviate to G because (1− r)a+ δG < 0. He
will not choose Q either because (1− r)b+ δQ < 0. (B) If not learning the
type the juri acquits in Q with probability s, but convicts with probability
1 − s. Hence, no type can be strictly better oﬀ by deviating to Q, and
deviating to G is the same as in (A).
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iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): (A) Payoﬀ for type G is b[r + (1 − r)pIC ],
for type I it is (1− r)pICb. Type G won't deviate to G iﬀ pIC ≤ a/b−r1−r . Note
that this requires a ≤ rb. Under no circumstances will he deviate to Q
because of the lowest possible payoﬀ b. Type I does not deviate to G iﬀ
pIC ≤ (1−r)a+δG(1−r)b , and under no circumstances it would be of strict advantage
to deviate to Q because with it I would earn (1 − r)b + δQ. (B) Also in
this case deviation to Q can be discouraged because for pG = p˜
∗
G conviction
is optimal for the juri.
Lemma 6 A class of pooling equilibria (I, I) does exist for both settings, (A)
and (B), iﬀ pG ≤ p˜∗G and a ≤ rb. In the pure-strategy equilibrium the defendant
is acquitted in equilibrium. For pG = p˜
∗
G, and with a < rb, the juri may use a
mixed strategy with pIC ∈ (0,min{ (1−r)b+δG(1−r)b , a/b−r1−r }]. In all cases, besides of the
restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such that the juri
convicts the defendant at the respective information set.
I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: Given type G's supposed choice I,
option G cannot make part of type I's strategy because G had incentives to
deviate. Looking then at mixing between Q and I, we observe that, in this case,
the G-type would deviate to Q unless he is always acquitted in I. Note that this
argument holds for setting (B) because the supposed equilibrium would identify
the player who chooses Q as the G-type. Then, however, also type I would
strictly prefer I over Q. Therefore, no mixed strategy equilibrium can exist in
which type G chooses the pure strategy I.
4) G strictly mixes (G, Q, I)
By taking into consideration the results from Table 1 it follows that type I must
choose I. Then the juri's believe must be p(G|G) = p(G|Q) = 1, and p(G|I) =
pG·qGI
pG·qGI +(1−pG)
. It then follows that pGC = p
Q
C = 1 because choices must be optimal
given beliefs. Then, however, type G should strictly prefer G over Q. This
argument holds independently of setting (A) or (B). Hence, this constellation is
impossible in equilibrium.
5) G strictly mixes (G, Q)
In this case, I's choice can only be either I or Q because with G his destiny is
the same, but he saves disutility by saying no lie.
I chooses I: (A) Type G is identiﬁed as such in G and Q and thus convicted.
Then, however, it is strictly better to choose G. So this cannot be an equilibrium.
(B) Although being identiﬁed in Q as type G, this type only will always be
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convicted iﬀ pG ≥ p˜∗G. But then G strictly prefers G. If pG < p˜∗G, then he will
be acquitted with probability s and convicted with probability 1− s, leading to
payoﬀ b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)] = a. This implies s = 1 − a/b−r
1−r . In I type G would
earn rb, implying that deviation is not of strict advantage iﬀ a ≥ rb. Type I
earns 0 in I, so he strictly prefers this option over all alternatives.
Lemma 7 In setting (B) a separating equilibrium exists where type G strictly
mixes (G,Q) with any probability and type I chooses I iﬀ a ≥ rb, pG < p˜∗G and
s = 1− a/b−r
1−r .
I chooses Q: (A) Since A is indiﬀerent between G and Q we must have a =
rb + (1 − r)pQCb, i.e. pQC = a/b−r1−r . This requires a ≤ rb. Payoﬀ for type I then is
(1− r)pQCb+ δQ = a− rb+ δQ. Type G does not deviate to I because b < a. Type
I won't deviate to G, and he won't choose I iﬀ δQ ≥ b − a. If a = rb we have
pQC = 0, and therefore p(G|Q) ≤ p˜∗G, i.e. qGQ ≤ (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. If a < rb then pQC 6= 0,
and the juri must be indiﬀerent between conviction and acquittal. This requires
p(G|Q) = p˜∗G, i.e. qGQ = (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. This is only possible for pG ≥ p˜∗G. (B) Since
p(G|Q) ≤ pG, and Q is on the equilibrium path, the juri always uses p(G|Q) as
base of its decision. Hence, the equilibrium is the same as in (A).
These results can be gathered in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 A class of semi-pooling equilibria exists, where type G mixes (G,Q)
and type I chooses Q iﬀ a ≤ rb and δQ ≥ b−a. The juri's strategy is (pGC , pQC , pIC) =
(1, a/b−r
1−r , 1), where the out-of-equilibrium belief p(G|I) = 1 supports pIC = 1. If
a = rb the G-type can use any mixed strategy with qGQ ∈
(
0,
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
)
. If a < rb
and pG ≥ p˜∗G the G-type uses mixed strategy qGQ = (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. This class coincides
for both settings, (A) and(B).
Note that technicaly qGQ = 0 is excluded here for a = rb because it makes part of
the corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium.
I strictly mixes Q and I: This would mean that, when observing I, the juri
must acquit because only type I sends this signal. But then I is strictly better-oﬀ
with claiming I than with anything else.
6) G strictly mixes (G, I)
In this case type I's choice can only be I or Q (see Table 1).
15
I chooses I: Then p(G|G) = 1, p(G|I) = pGqGI
pGq
G
I +(1−pG)
, but p(G|Q) is not
determined by Bayesian updating becauseQ is out-of-equilibrium. Hence, pGC = 1,
and, by (11), pIC =
a−rb
b−rb 6= 1.
If a = rb then pIC = 0, or equivalently, p
I
A = 1. Acquittal after hearing I then is
only optimal if p(G|I) ≤ p˜∗G, which means qGI ≤ (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
, i.e. the G-type should
not use I too often.
If a < rb then pIC 6= 1, meaning that the juri strictly mixes. This only happens
if p(G|I) = p˜∗G or qGI = (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. Note that p(G|I) = p˜∗G is only possible for
pG ≥ p˜∗G since type I is always supposed to choose I.
For both cases (a ≤ rb), we now look under which circumstances one or the
other type of defendant has incentives to deviate from the prescribed strategy. In
setting (A) we assume that, out-of-equilibrium, p(G|Q) = 1 in order to maximize
disincentives to do so. For setting (B) we require that, with probability s the juri
uses a-priori probabilities, whereas with probability 1 − s bases its decision on
p(G|Q) = 1.
(A) Type G does not deviate to Q because we would have payoﬀ b which is
lower than a by using the mixed strategy (G, I). Type I does not deviate to Q
iﬀ (1 − r)b + δQ ≤ (1 − r)pICb, a condition that is always fulﬁlled. Type I does
not deviate to G iﬀ (1 − r)a + δG ≤ (1 − r)pICb or pIc ≤ (1−r)a+δG(1−r)b . Because of
pIC =
a−rb
b−rb , we require r(a− b) ≥ δG, which is always the case. So this makes up
an equilibrium.
(B) For pG ≤ p˜∗G type G does not deviate to Q iﬀ b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)] ≤ a,
i.e. s ≤ 1 − a/b−r
1−r = 1 − pIC (a). For pG ≥ p˜∗G he does not deviate to Q iﬀ
rb+ (1− r)[sb+ (1− s)b] ≤ a, i.e. b ≤ a, which is always fulﬁlled. As to type I,
he does not have incentives to deviate to G iﬀ (1−r)a+δG ≤ (1−r)pICb = a−br,
i.e. δG ≤ r(a− b), which is always satisﬁed. In case of pG ≤ p˜∗G not deviating to
Q is optimal for (1− r)(1− s)b+ δQ ≤ a− br, i.e. s ≤ 1− a/b−r−δQ/b1−r (b), and for
pG ≥ p˜∗G it is never of advantage to choose Q. Note that (a) implies (b).
Lemma 9 A class of equilibria in strictly mixed strategies, with defendant type
G strictly mixing using (G, I) and type I choosing I exists iﬀ
(A) For a = rb, any qGI ∈ (0, (1−pG)p˜GpG(1−p˜G) ] makes part of an equilibrium of this
class. For a < rb we require in addition pG ≥ p˜∗G, and in this case we
must have qGI =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. In both cases the juri's equilibrium strategy
is (pGC , p
Q
C , p
I
C) = (1, 1,
a/b−r
1−r ), where p
Q
C = 1 is supported by the out-of-
equilibrium belief p(G|Q) = 1.
(B) For pG ≥ p˜∗G same as in (A), as well as for pG < p˜∗G in conjunction with
a = rb.
16
I chooses Q: Then pGC = p
I
C = 1 and p
Q
C = 0. Using (11), we obtain the
contradiction a = b. Therefore, this cannot be part of an equilibrium.
I strictly mixes Q and I: In this case p(G|G) = 1, p(G|I) = pGqGI
pGq
G
I +(1−pG)qII
,
and p(G|Q) = 0, implying pGC = 1 and pQC = 0. Also, by (11), pIC = a−rb(1−r)b , and by
(19), pIC =
δQ
(1−r)b . Therefore, parameters must satisfy δQ = a− rb < 0. But then
type G has an incentive to deviate to Q, because instead of a he would receive
rb, which would be higher. Therefore, the case analyzed in the present paragraph
cannot be part of an equilibrium.
7) G strictly mixes (Q, I)
Using the earlier results depicted in Table 1 this case is only compatible with
type I choosing I or G.
I chooses G: In either setting type G would be identiﬁed as such an received
the maximum sentence in I. Therefore, he were strictly better with saying G.
Hence, this cannot be part of an equilibrium.
I chooses I: (A) G is identiﬁed in Q as such and, therefore, would be better-
oﬀ choosing G. (B) For pG > p˜
∗
G type G is convicted in Q in any case. So he
should deviate to G. For pG ≤ p˜∗G there is acquittal in Q with probability s but
conviction with probability 1− s, leading to expected payoﬀ (1− s)b. Since type
I is always supposed to choose I we have p(G|I) < pG ≤ p˜∗G leading to acquittal
in I. Hence, type G would better choose I.
I strictly mixes I and G: (A) Type G is identiﬁed in Q as such and gets
maximum penalty. Therefore, he would deviate to G. Hence, the constellation is
not possible in equilibrium. (B) In G there must be acquittal. So type G should
choose G unless also acquitted in Q and I. But in this case type I should strictly
prefer I over G. So this cannot be an equilibrium.
This concludes the exhaustive analysis of existence of equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.
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